As the U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation hearings into the Titan submersible disaster unfold, a troubling picture is emerging about the design and operational decisions that led to the fateful implosion during a sightseeing trip to the Titanic in June 2023. Over the past week, the hearings have revealed critical testimonies from former employees of OceanGate, shedding light on the internal dynamics of the company and the decisions that may have contributed to the tragedy.
One of the focal points of the hearings has been the leadership of Stockton Rush, the CEO of OceanGate, who tragically lost his life while piloting the Titan. Witnesses have painted a complex portrait of Rush, characterized by urgency and a drive for cost efficiency. Tony Nissen, a former director of engineering at OceanGate, testified that Rush frequently made critical decisions based on speed and financial constraints, often changing his mind on a daily basis. Nissen claimed that Rush fired him after Nissen advocated for scrapping the Titan’s first carbon fiber hull over safety concerns, highlighting a troubling prioritization of expediency over safety.
David Lochridge, another former director at OceanGate, recounted a disturbing incident involving Rush during an earlier dive. He described a moment of panic when Rush made piloting errors on the company’s first submersible, leading to an aggressive confrontation that culminated in Rush throwing a controller at Lochridge. “He would blame everything on everyone else,” Lochridge stated, calling it a pattern of bullying behavior. He also alleged that critical components were assembled using parts from a home improvement store at Rush’s direction, raising further questions about the safety protocols in place.
Despite these serious accusations, some witnesses defended Rush’s character. Renata Rojas, a paying passenger on several OceanGate expeditions, praised Rush as “very fair” and denied Lochridge’s claims regarding the Andrea Doria incident. Another passenger, Fred Hagen, acknowledged the inherent risks of deep-sea exploration, stating, “It wasn’t supposed to be safe. It was supposed to be a thrilling adventure.”
The hearings have also scrutinized the Titan’s design and construction practices, revealing significant departures from industry standards. Nissen defended his initial design for the submersible but highlighted that OceanGate often ignored established construction practices. The company relied solely on one scale model of the carbon fiber hull, which failed early in testing under high pressures, yet they proceeded to build a full-scale version without adequate validation.
Dave Dyer, an engineer from the University of Washington, recounted his lab’s withdrawal of support for OceanGate in 2017 due to disagreements over the use of glass control spheres, which Dyer feared could pose catastrophic risks at depth. Instead of conducting thorough inspections or establishing a finite lifetime for the Titan’s hull, OceanGate opted for an untested acoustic monitoring system to signal potential failures—a choice that has since been called into question by several witnesses.
As the hearings continue through September 27, many critical questions remain unanswered. Why did the Titan fail so suddenly? Who bears ultimate responsibility for the deaths of the five crew members? The testimonies provided so far have painted a troubling picture of the operational culture at OceanGate, characterized by a troubling mix of ambition, negligence, and a lack of adherence to safety protocols.
The ongoing investigation into the Titan disaster serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of stringent safety measures and ethical decision-making in high-risk industries. As we await the final conclusions of the hearings, the tragic loss of life in this incident underscores the need for accountability and a reevaluation of practices within the deep-sea exploration sector.
Read more at Wired.